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On 15 December 2015 the European Commission proposed a 
European Border and Coast Guard to protect Europe’s external 
borders and the Schengen area without internal borders (http://
europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-6327_en.htm). As 2015 comes 
to a close, the annual numbers of migrants smuggled to Greece and 
Italy and asylum claims lodged in Germany have passed a million, as 
well as the number of additional displacements produced this year 
by the conflict in Syria. Moreover, Europe’s Mediterranean shore 
has now the unchallenged title of the world’s most lethal border. 
Not only this. The migrant crisis is also putting to the test some of 
Europe’s most fundamental values, from the freedom of circulation 
within its territories, to international protection beyond. 
The massive numbers of people risking their lives through a variety 
of sea-and-land routes to force their entry into Europe without a 
visa, raise  three important questions.
– First, what is the nature of the crisis? Is it a migrant or a refugee 
crisis? Are flows of people entering Europe irregularly in search of 
economic opportunities or are they seeking international protection? 
In the first case, there is a consensus among governments that they 
must be returned. In the second case, as soon as they lodge a claim 
for asylum, there is a legal duty to keep them until claims are fully 
processed. 
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– Second, what triggered the crisis? 
Was it pull-factors in Europe or push-factors in the 
Middle East? Did we attract the migrants by opening 
our doors too wide or were they set on the move 
across EU borders by forces beyond our control? In 
other words, where should we search for a response: 
within or outside Europe?
– Third: how can we best get out of the crisis? 
Can we foresee future developments, gauge the 
sustainability of measures taken in a moment 
of great confusion and anticipate their possible 
outcomes, wanted or unwanted?
A close look at the facts brings some answers to 
these questions. 
 
I - What do the facts tell us?
First, the crisis, which started in 2014, must be 
understood as a dramatic change in the course of a 
chronic disease. While unauthorised entries across 
the Mediterranean into Europe have been a large-
scale phenomenon since the 1980s, their magnitude 
and pattern radically changed in the course of 
2014. Irregular cross-Mediterranean migration was 
initially triggered by visa requirements imposed 
on third-country nationals in the wake of Europe’s 
economic crisis of the mid-1970s. Numbers of 
crossers remained in the tens of thousands with no 
marked change until 2013 (Fig. 1). In 2014, though, 
they jumped to over 200,000, and in 2015 to over one 
million.
Why? Migratory routes gradually shifted from the 
high-risk, central Mediterranean to the less risky 
eastern Mediterranean- route. Migratory routes 
have actually changed many times as a result of the 
changing geography of conflicts breaking out in the 
EU’s neighbourhood (Syria, Libya) and beyond (Iraq, 
Horn of Africa): as well as because of tightened state 
control in transit (e.g. Morocco) or destination (e.g. 
Spain) countries. Until 2014 each route closed by 
police controls was soon bypassed by a longer, more 
perilous route. 
Fig. 1: Unauthorised entries by sea into Greece, Italy, 
Malta and Spain 1998-2015 ((Nov 13) 
Sources: Greece, Police records (special MPC request); Italy, 
Ministry of Interior (MPC special request and unimonitorag-
gioimmigrazione@interno.it)
As a result, the Mediterranean has become, in the 
twenty-first century, the world’s most lethal migra-
tory route. Between 2000 and 2015 (Nov 13), 26,018 
deaths were reported for 1,277,399 persons crossing, 
meaning a 2.0% probability of death during the 
journey. While the year 2015 (till 13 Nov) comes 
third in terms of absolute numbers of deaths (3,121) 
it appears to be the least lethal in terms of risks, 
with a less than 0.6% probability of death (Fig. 2). 
This significant reduction in mortality at sea must 
be attributed to intensified search and rescue oper-
ations by the Italian navy and to a shift from the 
150-300 miles central Mediterranean route from 
Libya to Italy, to the 5-10-mile crossing from Turkey 
to the Greek Dodecanese Islands.  
It should be noted that the Mediterranean crossing 
is only part of the journey.  The rest is by land, both 
before crossing the sea (through Turkey or North 
Africa) and after crossing the sea from the first 
point reached in Southern Europe to the intended 
destination where asylum is claimed in North-
Western Europe. The whole journey can take 
anything from a few days to several years.
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Fig. 2: Probability of dying at sea during the cross-
Mediterranean journey to Europe (Deaths per 1,000 
crossings) 2000-2015
Sources: Author’s calculation using sources of  Figure 1 and 
dead and missing migrants provided by
(https : //docs .google.com/spreadsheets/d/1YNqIzy-
Q f E n 4 i _ b e 2 G G W E S n G 2 Q 8 0 E _ f L A S f f s X d C O f t I /
edit?pli=1#gid=1085726718)
Second a variety of nationalities converge towards a 
limited number of entry points into Europe to form 
migration flows that are ‘mixed’, both in terms of 
origin and status (refugees vs. economic migrants). 
A rough idea can be drawn from a comparison over 
time (2011-2015) and space (Greece and Italy) (Tab. 
1). 
- Refugee flows to Greece and Italy have had a rapidly 
changing composition in nationality terms. Changes 
can reflect the emergence of new refugee situations 
(e.g. Syria), but also the protracted character of other 
situations (e.g. Afghanistan) when doors that were 
shut suddenly open.
- The percentage of the total number of entries 
represented by the first largest nationality has 
increased over time. In Greece the first nationality 
comprised 28% of all entries in 2011 (Afghanistan) 
against 66% in 2015 (Syrians); in Italy percentages 
were 9% in 2011 (Nigerians) against 25% in 2015 
(Eritreans). 
- Syrians, the largest overall group, changed direction 
in 2015. Before 2015, they mostly took the central 
Mediterranean route from Libya (or Egypt or even 
Lebanon) to Italy when they suddenly changed to an 
Eastern Mediterranean route from Turkey to Greece. 
The shift from a long and extremely perilous to a 
shorter and safer crossing has allowed a much larger 
number of Syrian refugees to reach the EU’s external 
borders and to seek asylum.  
The distribution of smuggled migrants by nationality 
has dramatically shifted from a majority of people 
with a low likelihood of being granted refugee status 
to a majority of people with a high probability of 
receiving a positive answer to their asylum claim. 
Certainly refugees are estimated to be a majority in 
the most recent flows of irregular migration to Italy 
and Greece, and their proportion has spectacularly 
increased in the last five years: from 30.3% to 78.9%. 
The allegations that people smuggled across the 
external border of Europe would mostly be economic 
migrants disguised as asylum seekers trying to cheat 
their way into the EU are less and less relevant.  
Third, most of the people whose nationality suggests 
that they are fleeing war, persecution and life-
threatening conditions do not apply for asylum in 
the first country they reach in Europe (despite this 
country being a safe place). The fact has been used 
by some observers as an argument that these are not 
true refugees but economic migrants, not asylum 
seekers but welfare seekers.  To quote an official in 
the European Commission’s Directorate General 
for Trade who shares these views: “the situation 
[that] countries like Hungary, Croatia, and Austria, 
are facing is that of an unprecedented quantity of 
(unarmed) invaders who do not have, and do not 
ask for, refugee status. Their intended destination is 
Germany, where they believe a new life in wealth and 
social security awaits them” http://www.ejiltalk.org/
moving-beyond-the-asylum-muddle/
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Field evidence shows the limits of this view. Most 
refugees are smuggled to Europe after a long stay in 
countries of first asylum where they had no access 
to livelihoods. Once their savings dry up, or in 
anticipation of the moment when this happens, they 
need to earn an income in order to see a future for 
themselves and their families. They have little choice 
but to move. After all, refugees are human beings. 
Fourth, the question of what triggered the crisis — 
pull or push factors — has stirred much debate in 
Europe. On the pull-hypothesis side, when numbers 
of irregular entries started to boom in 2014, the Italian 
search and rescue operation at sea and into Libyan 
waters to prevent those crossing from drowning, 
was soon blamed for encouraging more people to 
come. The British Foreign Office was particularly 
vociferous in this respect http://www.theguardian.
com/politics/2014/oct/27/uk-mediterranean-
migrant-rescue-plan. Why, then, would have the 
main route shifted from Italy to Greece?
Tab. 1: Top Ten Nationalities of Migrants Smuggled into Greece and Italy 2011-2015
Country of      
declared 
nationality
Refugees 
% (*)
Numbers of migrants / Year
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 (13 Nov)
Syria 94.1% 947 8,507 18,972 74,461 285,084
Afghanistan 59.9% 17,841 18,323 6,924 13,685 76,735
Eritrea 86.0% 1,060 2,351 10,406 34,470 37,954
Albania 23.8% 11,982 12,374 5,497 7,299 15,898
Pakistan 25.4% 5,960 807 2,835 8,834 20,050
Nigeria 9.0% 28,827 2,874 925 1,674 910
Tunisia 61.6% 2,429 3,944 4,205 7,520 13,947
Somalia 71.8% 1,834 2,355 739 1,701 22,550
Iraq 10.1% 4,514 8,485 1,721 5,522 7,341
Bangladesh 36.1% 2,486 417 1,723 9,535 5,333
All Nationalities 119,635 90,145 82,684 247,262 564,675
Refugees % (**) 30.3% 48.9% 68.5% 74.0% 78.9%
(*) Rate of positive answers to asylum claims lodged in the EU28 in 2011-15
(**) Expected rate of positive answers to asylum claims lodged in the EU28 by migrants smuggled into Greece and Italy 2011-15
Source: Author’s calculation based on EUROSTAT (Rate of positive answers to asylum claims ) and Greece and Italy Police 
(smuggled migrants).
Fig.3: First time asylum applicants in the EU28 by 
citizenship - Monthly data
Source: EUROSTAT
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The situation of refugees in the MENA region will 
deteriorate, but the situation of their hosts will 
also suffer. Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan (and to a 
lesser extent Iraq) have undoubtedly been the most 
generous states in opening their borders and offering 
protection to more than four million Syrian refugees 
since 2011 (Fig. 4).  They accepted the burden of 
sheltering the vast majority of those fleeing Syria, but 
a great strain was put on their economies, and even 
on their political stability and security. Since 2014, 
Jordan and Lebanon have taken measures to make 
it almost impossible for new refugees to arrive. They 
restrict the stay of those already in their countries, 
leaving Turkey as the only haven left at the border 
of Syria.  Cases of return to Syria and departure for 
Europe have been increasingly frequent since then. 
Social equilibrium, political stability and security 
are now being put at risk: it is no longer just an 
economic matter. Shutting the door on refugees and 
locking them up on Europe’s doorstep may seriously 
destabilise these countries and indirectly endanger 
Europe’s security.
In Lebanon the government set three priorities in 
October 2014: reducing the number of refugees; 
providing more security to citizens; and preventing 
Syrians from working unlawfully and creating unfair 
competition to citizens. It barred the way to new 
refugees and soon tightened the procedures for 
The push interpretation must be considered more 
seriously if a response is to be found to the crisis.  Far 
from abating, the level of violence in war-torn zones 
of the Middle East reached new peaks from 2014 
through 2015. The Islamic State has consolidated 
its position in Iraq and seized most of central Syria. 
In doing so it has added new waves of internally 
displaced people (IDPs) and refugees to those 
already created by the protracted conflict. Moreover, 
with the passing of time the situation in countries 
of first asylum neighbouring Syria has deteriorated, 
with humanitarian aid becoming rarer and tensions 
rising between refugees and their hosts. 
Looking at monthly flows of first-time asylum seekers 
into the EU28, one can clearly see that the movement 
started with Syrians in the fall of 2013 (Fig. 3). It is 
only months later that other flows — mostly refugees 
from Eritrea and Afghanistan and mostly economic 
flows from Kosovo, rose in turn.  In a sense, Syrians 
have unlocked the door for other nations.
II - What next?
There is little doubt that the refugee movements 
will continue in Europe’s neighbourhood. On the 
one hand wars and conflicts that produce forced 
migration — Syria, Iraq, Palestine, Libya. — will 
likely continue for some time. On the other hand, 
the further migration of refugees sheltered in Jordan, 
Lebanon, Iraq and Turkey will gain momentum.  
The MENA region is host (and source) to 50% of the 
world’s 20 million refugees (UNHCR and UNRWA). 
Many of these countries are not signatories of the 
1951 United Nations Refugee Convention. They 
initially welcomed refugees and continue to tolerate 
their presence, but they do not offer them refugee 
status. They have a charity-based, rather than a 
rights-based, approach to the question. 
Refugees are ‘guests’. As such, they enjoy few or no 
rights. Once their entry visa expires, they become 
unauthorised migrants and find themselves fated to 
exploitation and destitution, or they must leave.
Fig. 4: Syria’s Displaced Population by Country or 
Region (1 October 2015)
Sources: UNHCR for Syria and countries of 1st asylum; 
EUROSTAT for Europe
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registered refugees to renew their residence permits. 
This resulted in many Syrians losing their legal 
status who now risk being told to leave the country. 
A vulnerability assessment of the Syrian refugees 
reveals an increase in the proportion of households 
below the poverty line, from 50% in 2014 to 70% in 
2015. Another survey in 2015 shows a shift in the 
perception and reception of Syrian refugees by their 
Lebanese hosts, from initial sympathy to mounting 
hostility. 
In Jordan, the situation is equally precarious. 
Administratively, UNHCR-recognised refugees 
are granted a one-year stay during which the UN 
agency must find a durable solution (in practice, 
resettlement in another country). As there is no 
durable solution, the vast majority of Syrians risk 
becoming illegal, and some of them have apparently 
been forcibly returned to Syria. Economically, 
the conditions of Syrians have deteriorated. In 
September 2015, half of the refugees in urban 
settings stopped receiving aid from the World Food 
Program. In increasing numbers, refugees in camps 
tend to settle in cities, which they can only do under 
the guarantee of a Jordanian sponsor, in application 
of a rule reminiscent of the sponsorship system in 
force in the Gulf States. 
Turkey, a signatory of the 1951 Refugee Convention, 
is rather different. The country still has the 
geographical limitation by which non-European 
refugees are eligible only for temporary asylum. But a 
new Law on Foreigners and International Protection 
(2013) provides them, at least on the paper, with 
rights close to those guaranteed by the Convention. 
While the government has so far maintained the 
door relatively open to Syrian refugees, cases of 
unlawful detention and deportation by the Turkish 
authorities have been reported (https://www.
amnesty.org/en/documents/eur44/3022/2015/en/). 
Moreover, tensions have been mounting in the 
population, with anti-refugee demonstrations and 
attacks on refugees. For many Syrians, Turkey is not 
the safe haven Europe would like it to be. Since 2014, 
though, it has become the main country of transit 
for Syrian (and other) refugees to Europe. 
How is Europe responding to current challenges and 
anticipating those to come? After a period when EU 
Members States were divided between two opposite 
stances – keeping the door open vs. erecting wire 
fences – a convergence of views began towards the 
end of 2015. Keeping refugee movements away 
from Europe has become their leitmotiv. Efforts to 
better control the two main routes of unauthorized 
migration have, thus, been made.
The Eastern Mediterranean route may be better 
controlled with the collaboration of Turkey. On 
29 November 2015, the EU and Turkey passed an 
agreement to support the Syrians under temporary 
protection and their Turkish hosting communities, 
and to strengthen cooperation to prevent irregular 
migration from Turkey to Europe. The objective 
for Europe is to keep as many Syrian refugees as 
possible within Turkey (i.e. away from Europe). 
For Turkey, it is to obtain, in exchange, increased 
financial assistance and, perhaps more importantly, 
to negotiate visa liberalisation for Turkish citizens 
travelling to Europe and to keep alive Turkey’s 
accession negotiations to the EU.
The central Mediterranean route cannot be 
controlled in collaboration with Libya from where 
most people smuggled into Italy depart. Indeed, 
there are no credible state interlocutors in Libya. 
Europe, therefore, will do the job alone and tackle, 
at high sea, the migrant smugglers operating from 
Libya through the “Sophia operation” endorsed by 
the United Nations Security Council on 9 October 
2015 (http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc12072.
doc.htm).
But make no mistake, shutting the door on those 
fleeing persecution and life-threatening conditions 
by confining them to Turkey or to Libya (one of 
the unsafest places on earth) will not deter them 
from finding protection. It will simply make their 
journey more difficult and perilous, and raise 
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the price requested by new smugglers, who will 
quickly resurface. Eliminating the smugglers is not a 
response to the crisis.  Smugglers are the wrong and 
criminal solution to a real problem: that of people 
in need of international protection who cannot 
reach the European Union through legal channels. 
Were smugglers to be completely eliminated, 
unknown but probably large numbers of refugees 
and migrants would find themselves trapped in 
Libya for lack of a way out. They would be left at the 
mercy of uncontrolled militias and exposed to abuse, 
persecution, and death.
Progress will only be made if the problem itself is 
tackled. If the goal is to check irregular migration, 
visas must be made available to refugees in transit 
countries before they resort to smugglers: in 
Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, etc. European embassies 
(or, EU delegations?) in these countries could use 
procedures that already exist on paper, such as 
humanitarian or asylum visas. It would not only work 
for the security of the refugees by short-circuiting 
the perilous journey. It would also be positive for 
the security of European states by checking traveller 
identities before they reach Europe in big crowds 
that can hide terrorists:  see the 11/13 terrorist attack 
in Paris.
A new tool – the “hotspots” –   designed to fingerprint 
and debrief smuggled migrants in order to separate 
those in need of protection whose claims for asylum 
must be processed from those who are not refugees 
and must be returned is being established in Greece 
and Italy (http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/
what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/
background-information/docs/2_hotspots_en.pdf). 
The hotspot approach is intended to speed up the 
screening process and to avoid crowds crossing in 
a disorderly fashion from Mediterranean Europe to 
North-Western Europe. 
But for this new system to contribute to eliminating 
the cross-Mediterranean smuggling business, 
hotspots should be installed not in Europe but in 
neighbouring countries: In Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, 
etc. This brings us back to the long-recommended 
implementation of humanitarian or asylum visas 
in the countries where the refugees find themselves 
before embarking on their smuggling journey. 
Finally, one should remember that the refugee crisis 
is unfolding against the backdrop of two other 
crises: a protracted economic crisis which generates 
unacceptably high rates of unemployment amongst 
Europeans; and a looming demographic crisis with 
unprecedented prospects for population decline. 
At the same time, migrants can be regarded as a 
problem (they compete with natives for scarce job 
opportunities) and a solution (they will eventually 
replace the missing natives).   While the economic 
crisis will pass, the demographic crisis will gain 
massive momentum. It will take decades to overcome. 
Replacement migration will have to be part of 
Europe’s response to its demographic predicament. 
In anticipation of future needs, creative policies 
should be designed to turn the burden of refugees 
into an asset. There are signs that massive flows of 
refugees have already produced a net benefit for 
European economies. The European Economic 
Forecast of Autumn 2015 (http://ec.europa.eu/
economy_finance/publications/eeip/pdf/ip011_
en.pdf) indicates that additional public expenditures 
have generated an 0.2% increase in GDP. In the 
medium-term, a greater positive impact on growth 
is to be expected from the increase in labour supply. 
The condition is that appropriate policies are put in 
place to facilitate the refugees’ access to the labour 
market. 
The problem is that politicians are better at dealing 
with the very short-term (essentially the next 
election) than with the mid- and long-term. They 
are better at addressing public opinion about present 
hardships than at informing them about additional 
difficulties waiting around the corner. They find it 
difficult to address those structural changes that 
are barely felt in daily life, such as demography or 
climate change. Political courage is needed for this 
and there is little to go around. 
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